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Invasion of the Body Snatchers? Burglary Reconsidered.
Abstract:  
The victim of crime has become the focus of increasing concern in recent years, 
particularly in the context of the impact crime has on its victims. This article takes a 
novel approach within this debate contending that the conceptualisation of 
victimisation remains underdeveloped with respect to the experience of crime for 
victims. In particular, this article explores elements of threat to or loss of property and 
physical safety that impinge on personal and communal well-being.  Further, we draw 
together perspectives on 'well-being' that focus on the boundaries of body, home and 
personal space as key constituents of a sense of both identity and safety.  We argue for 
a richer conceptualisation of victimisation developing existing approaches with 
discussions of fear, embodiment and personal/spatial 'privacy'. 
Key words: victim, home, embodiment, invasion of privacy, objects, burglary
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Introduction
Within contemporary academic debate it is widely accepted that, in the last few years, the victim 
of crime has become an increasing focus of attention, analysis and discussion within both 
academic and political spheres and in more populist 'law and order' debates.  As a number of 
theorists have argued (see for example Grimshaw,1989; Mawby and Walklate, 1994; Young, 
1986, 1994), there has been an increasing shift away from offenders and the causes of their 
behaviour towards the victim of crime and the impact of victimisation.  Indeed, some notion of 
the victim of crime can in many respects now be regarded as both implicitly and explicitly central 
in contemporary debates around issues such as fear of crime, urban regeneration and 
redevelopment and situational crime prevention as well as criminal victimisation1.  The 
collection and analysis of crime and victimisation statistics by both governmental and academic 
bodies, and the use of crime surveys on a cross-national, national and local level have become 
relatively commonplace. In the process a great deal of data on the extent and aspects of the 
impact of criminal victimisation has been assembled.
  
In addition, the emotional impact of victimisation has been increasingly examined (see for 
example Edwards, 1989; Stanko, 1990), particularly in the case of crimes against the person 
involving violence.  It is within this context that this article will develop its argument.  While the 
nature of embodied, emotional responses to certain forms of criminal victimisation are to an 
extent being examined, we would argue that the emotional effects of property crimes such as 
burglary and theft of and from one’s car, while being widely recognised in much of the literature, 
remain relatively undertheorised.  In order to try and unpack the nature of victim’s responses to 
property crimes, this article will examine existing data and debates within victimology and 
1 To the extent that, as Karmen (1990) has argued, crime prevention initiatives have increasingly 
become exercises in 'victimisation prevention'.
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criminology in order to identify a range of common responses to this form of victimisation which 
have been identified in much of the existing research. This article will also draw on aspects of 
our own research (on consumption and 'home' in a new private housing estate, and on older urban 
residents and their experiences of victimisation) to demonstrate the extent to which many of 
these responses to victimisation can only really be understood in the context of victim’s 
relationships to their homes, personal possessions and related significant personal objects.  We 
will argue that approaches within cultural theory which examine embodiment and boundaries, 
the home and personal possessions can make a significant contribution to critical victimology 
and aid our understanding of how victims respond to property crimes.  
Researching Victims of Burglary – the Context
Research into criminal victimisation in general and burglary victims in particular has in many 
respects been dominated by survey-based approaches.  Large scale surveys, such as the National 
Crime Survey (which has been carried out in the US annually since 1972), the British Crime 
Survey (which has taken place in England and Wales in1982, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 and 1998, 
with accompanying surveys in Scotland), and similar surveys in countries such as Canada, 
Australia and Holland have used relatively large samples to gauge respondents' experiences of 
crime.  In the process of this attempt to chart the ‘true’ extent of crime in their respective 
societies, these surveys have, because of the nature of their approach, essentially focused on 
personal victimisation.  Consequently, as Hough and Mayhew (1983:3) suggest, these surveys 
have been regarded as ‘an invaluable source of new information and the risks and consequences 
of victimisation’.  These government funded national criminal victimisation surveys have had 
important implications for policy initiatives on crime.  For example, in the British context, the 
BCS has served a twofold purpose: firstly, the victim-oriented approach of the BCS and its 
findings has played an important role in the development of relatively cost-effective but high-
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profile initiatives for ‘tackling crime’ which place an emphasis on victimisation avoidance, 
voluntary action and the ‘active citizen’. 2  Secondly, the data generated by the BCS has provided 
a useful method of minimizing the apparent level of crime and risk of criminal victimisation in 
British society.3
The findings of these descriptive national crime surveys produced by state-sponsored 
‘administrative criminology’ have stimulated an extensive critical literature that highlights the 
shortcomings of its approach. This literature cannot satisfactorily be examined in the limited 
confines of this article4, but, in particular, the possibility that national crime surveys have been 
unable fully to uncover the impact of issues such as gender, ethnicity, locality on experiences of 
victimisation of socially located individuals has been widely discussed. Attempts to address these 
shortcomings, particularly by left-realist criminologists, have stimulated a range of local crime 
surveys which have attempted a more explanatory approach to the patterning and experience of 
victimisation in specific localities.5  In particular, the local surveys have identified different patterns 
of victimisation, particularly related to gender and ethnicity, with far higher levels of sexually and 
racially motivated offences than suggested by national surveys such as the BCS.
In many respects, while local crime surveys have identified a range of issues which national crime 
surveys could not address, they too have been subject to criticisms that in many respects echo those 
levelled at national surveys.  So, as Walklate (1990: 31-32) points out, while local crime surveys 
may espouse a commitment to concepts of age, class, gender and ethnicity, they tend to share with 
2 For more discussion of this see Mawby & Walklate (1994)
3 For example, the often cited assertion from the BCS that '… a ‘statistically’ average person aged 16 or 
over can expect an assault resulting in injury once every century, a robbery once every five centuries …' 
(Hough & Mayhew, 1983: 15)
4 For further critiques of national crime surveys see for example Walklate, 1990; Mawby and Walklate, 
1994.
5 See for example Maxfield, 1987; Hough and Mayhew, 1983; Hough and Mayhew, 1985; Dowds, Elliott 
and Mayhew 1988; Jones, MacLean and Young, 1986; Crawford et. al. 1990).
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national surveys a tendency to offer a range of empirical observations concerning effects of 
victimisation rather than a consideration of the patternings and interconnections between these 
variables on a theoretical level.  In essence, such surveys tend to reduce criminal victimisation to a 
series of generalisable effects, with little concern for the complex experience of crime. Or, as Zedner 
has suggested: 
In switching attention from offenders to victims, it could be argued that victim surveys 
did no more than suggest a new subject area for positivist criminology…[T]he counting 
of crimes and detailed descriptions of the age, sex, socio-economic and geographical 
characteristics of victims could be said to do no more than provide a new measure of 
crime and a new set of portraits, in many ways parallel to those previously drawn of 
offenders.  (1994:1217) 
In this context, for both types of survey, the immediate experience of crime can often be seen as a 
‘black box’ that is taken for granted in the presumptions of survey designers.  For example, this 
‘black box’ of burglary contains a number of issues such as invasion of privacy, the loss of objects 
of sentimental value and strangers in the home: responses which are so self-evident, common and 
obvious that the reasons for these responses remain almost completely untheorised within 
victimology. 
Critical Victimology and the “Qualitative Turn” 
The apparent shortcomings of both traditional/administrative and left-realist approaches to 
victimisation have produced a range of theoretical responses which can broadly be termed critical 
victimology (Mawby & Walklate, 1994), an approach which while recognising the usefulness of 
criminal victimisation surveys asserts that this approach cannot effectively address both 
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victimisation in a general context and in the everyday lives of specific social actors.  In part, these 
concerns have led to a range of more qualitative, smaller-scale approaches to researching 
victimisation including use of focus groups and in-depth interview techniques in order to elicit the 
complex interplay of structure and experience.6  
This qualitative agenda calls for an approach which:
…takes account of a number of processes which contribute to the construction of 
everyday reality; people’s conscious activity, their ‘unconscious’ activity (that is, routine 
activities people engage in which serve to sustain, and sometimes change, the conditions 
in which they act), the generative mechanisms (unobservable and unobserved) which 
underpin daily life, and finally, both the intended and the unintended consequences of 
action which feed back into people’s knowledge… At a theoretical level it requires 
postulating and testing the existence of generative mechanisms which may underpin 
specific individual actions at specific moments. (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 18-20)
We suggest that this need is particularly pertinent in relation to property crime, since the a priori 
assumptions in surveys, policy outcomes and the tacit knowledges of everyday life recognise that 
property crimes such as burglary elicit emotional responses.  Yet, despite this widely-held 
recognition, the question remains: why do we respond in this way to these kind of offences? 
The rest of this article is concerned with an attempt to unpack this issue in relation to burglaries.  
 The next section will outline, with examples, some of the key responses which have consistently 
emerged from burglary victimisation research.  Following on from this, we will explore 
6 For an example of a more qualitative approach, see Maguire and Corbett, 1987.
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theoretical explanations for the relationships between people, homes and possessions that we 
think shed some light on the emotional impact of burglary.
Key Themes 
As stated earlier in this article, it is our contention that in much of the victimisation data relating 
to burglary, from national and local surveys, victim support organisations and small-scale 
qualitative research, certain key themes emerge from victims' responses to burglary.  These can 
basically be categorised in two ways:
• Invasion of privacy/the strange(r in the) home.
• Emotional investment in lost objects/comparative hierarchies of loss.
Burglary as an invasion of privacy, the intrusion of a stranger into one's home, the jolt to our 
sense of comfort, safety and security in our own home space is an issue which emerges 
consistently in research over a long period of time and in a range of social contexts (apparently 
irrespective of issues such as the financial impact of burglary).  In BCS data, invasion of privacy 
is the most commonly noted response to questions assessing the worst aspects of the burglary 
(Mirlees-Black et al, 1996), cited by 33% of respondents in the 1988 BCS.  In his study of 322 
burglary victims, Maguire (1982) found that 63% of victims cited invasion of privacy as the 
'worst' or 'second worst' aspect of their burglary. Identical concerns were expressed in a recent 
ethnography of older urban residents in South Manchester (Kearon, 1996, 1998).  In addition, in 
both academic research and more 'common sense'/media representations of burglary, the loss of 
items of sentimental value, and the subsequent emotional effect on the victim is another common 
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theme.  In the ethnography of older urban residents referred to above, the loss of items with some 
kind of sentimental value was frequently extremely significant and upsetting:
A common feature of many of the responses in this research to loss of items as a result of 
burglary was the appearance of what could be termed a hierarchy of significance of objects. In 
these households at least there was a sense that certain objects (particularly electrical goods) were 
essentially utilitarian, and seemed to manifest little or no emotional investment.  The loss of 
objects such as televisions and videos was felt far less keenly, with the objects themselves being 
regarded as relatively easy to replace, and their loss regarded more of an inconvenience than as 
an upset.  The loss of other, more unique items (in particular jewellery) which appeared heavily 
invested with sentiments, memories and emotions, was usually felt far more strongly (often in 
conjunction with discourses of ‘invasion of privacy’).  
 
These issues which emerge consistently in much of the research into burglary raise interesting 
questions.  It seems apparent that the experience of burglary potentially has profound effects on 
its victims and their sense of control, ownership and comfort in their own home.  It problematises 
the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of our relationship to this domestic space, and confronts us with our 
relationship to the objects with which we fill this space (often provoking powerful emotional 
responses).  In some respects, as has been argued elsewhere (Kearon, 1998, 1996 and below), 
experiences of this nature may have implications for the ontological security of the individual.7 
7 Following Giddens, our use of this concept, 'refers to the confidence that most human beings have in 
the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material 
environments of action' (1990:92). Ontological security is an emotional, existential phenomenon 
concerned with 'being' in the social world, not in an abstract philosophical sense, but in the context of 
the day-to-day actions of socially located individuals.  Following Kierkegaard, Giddens suggests that 
the unknown, both in terms of a general sense of anxiety, dread, fear and chaos and in terms of the 
specific threat of 'fateful moments' (which could range from criminal victimisation to death), is only 
held at bay by the 'ordinariness of everyday conventions' (Giddens, 1991:36) - routine, structure, a 
sense of belonging and containment all contribute to the process of 'bracketing off' this chaos and 
securing the identity of the individual.  For further discussion of the impact of ontological insecurity see 
Young (1999).
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But why does burglary seem to have this impact?  In order to understand this we would argue 
that it is necessary to examine further the nature of 'home' and our relationships to our personal 
objects and possessions.
The significance of home, bodies and things
Recent victimology debates, as discussed in the previous sections, have broadly ignored the 
detailed examination of the experience of burglary and related property crimes. The 
undertheorisation of the nature of ‘victimhood’ is the principal outcome, which may have 
implications for policy and support systems.  In particular, we suggest that the complex 
relationship between people, their homes and the things that belong to them is of prime 
sociological and philosophical significance.  In much of the victimology literature the victim’s 
relationship to the things stolen and/or the privacy intruded upon is a ‘blackbox’, in which the 
categories and experiences are unexamined by researchers, since they appear so very obvious. 
But in an attempt to explore the specific processes of the lifeworld, we take the taken-for-granted 
very seriously.
In  what  follows,  we  argue  that  the  notion  of  embodiment  is  useful  in  understanding  the 
experience of burglary because it highlights a number of 'threats' and objects of threat which are 
neglected  in  the  existing  literature  as  discussed  above.   Such  threats  go  beyond  a  simple 
understanding of lost objects, even beyond a more complex grasp of objects' meaning within a 
symbolic frame.  Our position is that objects hold a more nuanced relation to the self, the body 
and the 'space' around bodies than the classic discussions of burglary allow.  
This nuanced position could be summarised with reference to different versions of embodiment 
that have emerged in recent literature on the body (eg. Csordas,1994; Price & Shildrick, 1999; 
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Feher,  1994;  also  see  the  journal  Body  & Society)  -  and  detailed  below  in  relation  to  the 
embodied experience of home and belongings.  It is  important  to note however, that for our 
purposes  the  schema  of  versions  of  embodiment  is  not  exhaustive,  nor  are  the  different 
categorisations to be seen as universal and isolated: we use this as a working model to begin to 
understand embodied experience. The first version of embodiment we call  literal embodiment. 
In the  case  of  the  burglary experience,  literal  embodiment  is  the  actual  sensations  felt  as  a 
consequence of invasion of privacy, loss of objects etc.  It is often experienced as fear, shock and 
dread manifesting as actual physical symptoms - shaking, sweating, changes in temperature and 
pallor for example.  In this very obvious sense, burglary can be an embodied experience - on its 
own however, this insight is not particularly interesting.  Embodiment becomes more interesting 
as a concept when we consider other versions used within social science.
A second version we are calling partial embodiment.  The idea of partial embodiment emerges 
in work which explores how the body 'lives' in space - both physical and social - in order to 
constitute itself as a sentient and sensate being.  The term partial attempts to summarise the ways 
bodies are always incomplete - bodies cannot operate without biological and social feedback. 
Such (social) feedback has been conceptualised in a variety of different ways.  Phenomenology 
(see  below;  Merleau-Ponty,  1962;  Crossley,  1994,  1995;  also  see  the  tradition  emergent  in 
Meadian sociology and psychology.) for example, conceives of bodies-as-lived as the immediate 
interaction  between,  and  extension  of,  matter  in  space.   There  are  a  series  of  important 
interactions between the potentials and feelings of the body (such as proprioception - the sense 
that the body has of 'itself' in space - and kinetics - the ability the body has to move in certain 
ways) and the 'world' at large - other people, objects in sensing range and, more complexly, the 
social and symbolic.  Merleau-Ponty's examples are lucid: one gets to know writing by using a 
pen, to know others by touch and talk, to know the world in blindness by use of a stick.  In other 
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words  partial  embodiment  recognises  that  bodies  are  not  simply  biological  entities  but 
intersubjective and interobjective relations that come into being and are experienced through a 
variety of practices. 
This sense of partial embodiment hints at a third version, which we title symbolic embodiment. 
Bodies do not only construct and come up against objects and people: they also come into being 
and engage in feedback within the social and symbolic environment.   The apparently diverse 
work of Bourdieu and Foucault is instructive here, since they both (in different ways) presume 
that layers of social and symbolic meaning allow the enactment of bodily practices and form 
constraints on bodily knowledges.  Foucault's (1979;1980) sense of disciplines of the body and 
Bourdieu's (1977; 1984) use of the term habitus indicate a body that enacts social differences and 
rewrites them as 'it' acts.  In other words, bodies are always inscribed within social space and 
symbolic rules - they are not simply universally undefined tools but are repositories of power. To 
summarise this for our purposes, embodiments of victim experiences could be investigated as 
manifestations  of disciplinary power or the appropriate  'habitus'  of  victimhood.   Victimhood 
could be defined and constrained by micro-knowledges of practice - an example for investigation 
might be the reconstruction of embodied victimhood in scenes of crime officer encounters; or 
indeed burglars' own transgressions/constructions of the boundaries of home.
A fourth version of embodiment might be termed metaphoric embodiment - in which the body 
'stands for' and/or extends to a wider social or material form.  Again this version clearly 
intertwines with the others, since the social and material can never really be separated from the 
symbolic.  As experience however, metaphoric embodiment encompasses wider versions of 
partial embodiment: most pertinently here, the house or possessions may be experienced as 
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extensions of the body or 'stand ins'.8 These versions of embodiment inform our understandings 
of the cultural and personal significance of home and belongings that we discuss in more detail 
below.
Dwelling places…
The key to our understanding of the complex and emotional experience of burglary is partially 
found in the significance of the home and possessions in Western cultures. In many ways, the 
emotional relationship to home and belongings, and the sense of belonging that (sometimes) 
emerges within such spaces, is very straightforward: our home is our territory9, a symbolic and 
emotional space in which we live with the fantasy of control.  Any invasion of such boundaries is 
deeply troubling.  But victimologists have not sufficiently brought together the extensive 
interdisciplinary debates that have explicitly addressed these questions of belonging, belongings 
and boundary struggles.  There is considerable (empirical and theoretical) reason to explore this 
dynamic further: home is symbolically central to Western (and particularly north European) 
mythology, history and literature; for many people, everyday material cultures configure identity 
and belonging; at a sociological level, domestic space is a fiercely contested and problematic 
territory that defines, constrains and contains powers and interactions.  For our purposes, we take 
cues from recent revivals of theoretical exploration into the investments made into belonging. 
Cultural theory is rediscovering ‘dwelling’ as a rich and ambiguous category within the social 
which denotes the experience of domestic space rather than its status as the bearer of structure.10 
8 We are grateful for a discussion with Elizabeth Stanko who pointed out the close link between 
violence towards women's possessions (and pets) by male partners, such that it is an extremely close 
indicator of impending violence to the body.  This strengthens the case that the body is in 'extension' 
beyond its physical boundaries.
9 While addressing this symbolic centrality, it would be naïve to suggest that this experience of home is 
uncontested or universal: clearly home and relations within it can equally be the source of emotional 
and physical discomfort.  However we do not believe that this recognition negates our concerns – if 
anything, this analysis would offer useful additions to the debate on domestic violence, gender relations 
and deprivation for example.
10 It can of course be both/and simultaneously.  On the revival of interest in dwelling, at different scales 
of spatial concern (including home, nation, tribalism etc.) see for example Putnam & Newton, 1990; 
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Dwelling works in two key ways: first, dwelling, homeliness, domesticity and familiarity are 
used as metaphoric representations of the processes of drawing in things that we ‘know’ – a sort 
of primary symbolisation. Second, however, dwelling is to be taken literally: this is a 
phenomenological recognition of the centrality of ‘home’ and ‘things’ to our basic grasp of the 
world.  This interrelationship – the recognition of the mutually constitutive character of the 
categories and experiences of home – is central to our concerns.  In particular, we wish to posit 
the importance of an embodied understanding of the home and belongings for understanding the 
experience of burglary.  We would argue that the experience of invasion of privacy, loss and 
disturbance caused by, and commonly described about, burglary can be explained by this 
disruption of the embodied experience of home.
In different contexts, cultural and social theorists have been working their way around to such an 
understanding of home.  Saunders’ (1988, 1989) pioneering but problematic work on 
consumption of home and ontological security begins to open out these questions.  Ontological 
security is borrowed from Giddens to suggest a certain clarity about boundaries and belonging. 
Saunders’ concern to account for privacy as a defining feature of this security was made in the 
context of a debate about owner-occupation: simply, it was suggested that private ownership was 
more likely to engender well-being and feelings of emotional investment and security.11 For us, 
the issue is the ontological security that is possible in any ordinary relations between people, 
residences and objects.12  This ontological security is a version of the forms of embodiment 
discussed above; as well as referring to people's sense of identity and symbolic belonging, it also 
refers to their practices of the body in habit, familiarity, status position and interaction.  Any 
Rybczynski, 1988; Samuels, 1989; Strathern, 1992; Maffesoli, 1995; Gurney, 1991.
11 Here we leave aside the now well-worn criticism that was levelled: that owner-occupation does not 
necessarily lead to ontological security, nor is it empirically clear that rented property leads to 
insecurity.  Rather, we would argue that Saunders clearly has a point; it is just that his literal definition 
of possession (as purchase and legal ownership) obscures the issue.
12 It is clear however that different types of homes/objects might engender different securities.
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breaching of this security can have profound effects upon the sense of well-being and homeliness 
of an environment.
Consumption as a way in to homes
Home has also become central in social and cultural theory as an adjunct to debates about 
consumption, commodities and taste.  In the concern to evaluate scales of meaning of different 
objects, and to explore the outcomes of exchange and the significance of symbolic hierarchies of 
identity, the home and objects within it have achieved an invigorated status.  Partly as a way of 
exploring the sociological/economic ‘blackbox’ of the household, home is now a key site for 
research - see, for example, Bourdieu (1984), Silverstone (1996), Miller (1990, 1994), Putnam & 
Newton (1990).  In particular, such approaches have attempted to challenge structural-
determinist accounts of consumption as the outcome of production relations.  Instead they 
(increasingly) highlight the constitutive powers of consumers to construct their own meanings 
and values from consumer objects.  As such, the object per se (including the home) has become 
invested in the literature with a transformative potential: objects and homes are both the sites of 
social structuring and the fabric on which creative ‘becoming’ is expressed as identity.
However, the object in consumer studies has not rested simply as the repository of identity. 
Rather, there is an increasing concern to map the ‘magical’ properties of the object.  There is a 
recognition of the fascination and aura that objects have for human beings and a continued 
attempt to pull out their ‘mute and brute’ qualities.  This concern for the unspeakability of things 
is perhaps best addressed in the literature on collecting and museology, which seeks to defend 
objects as having deep symbolic, social and material significance in all cultures; increasingly, 
there is a turn away from exoticised anthropological accounts of objects towards a concern for 
the aura of objects in Western consumer societies (Belk, 1995; Pearce, 1994)
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One of the most significant conclusions from such debates highlights the intense work that is 
done in constructing a sense of objects belonging to people: sentimental value cannot be taken 
for granted – rather it is a laboured (and embodied) achievement.  Authors highlight the 
investment, cultivation and extension of selves into objects  (Cziksentmihalyi & Rochberg-
Halton, 1981; Belk, 1995) and suggest that in doing so, the relationships between people and 
their objects are reflexively reconstructed.  This is particularly the case in the praxis of ritual 
engagement with objects, which is not simply an activity found in other more ‘spiritual’ cultures. 
In particular, there is a recognition that things are socially embedded, mobile and transformable: 
in other words, a thing is simultaneously materially, symbolically, ethically and spiritually 
constructed – as such, it can never be taken for granted.  These ideas are best represented in 
attempts to map the mobility of object relations found in, for example, Appadurai (1986, 
especially Kopytoff) and McCracken (1990).
The significance of these ideas for our purposes lies in the realisation that sentimental value rests 
in multiple dynamics – as such objects are opaque, ‘magically’ experienced and mute.  Sentiment 
(like aesthetics) needs to be considered in a manner closer to its original pre-18th century form13, 
as knowledge that exists because it emerges as an embodied response to things or 
contemplations: in other words, sentimental value can be perceived more as ‘feeling-of’ objects 
rather than cognitive, rationally explainable ‘meaning’.
Of particular significance are bodies of work that highlight the sense of metaphoric embodiment 
that objects represent - for example, Belk's (1988) piece on possessions and later work on 
collecting (1995) highlight the ways familiar and cherished things almost become forgotten, 
13 Eagleton’s  (1990) and Campbell’s(1987) account of the emergence of modern conceptions of 
sentiment and aesthesis are relevant here
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because they are so close.  This 'forgetting' becomes a 'standing in for' parts of the body such that 
the loss of objects is an amputation. Although amputation proper is clearly devastating, the use 
here conveys the way in which loss highlights how much a thing meant. Such meaningful things 
however are often, if not mostly, blended into the familiar background.  In a similar way to that 
in which body parts are not much thought about in day-to-day use (Merleau-Ponty's account 
(1962) of proprioception discusses this), truly loved and familiar objects become part of the 
'habitus' of comfort.  Maldonado (1991) beautifully describes this idea of comfort as embodied 
objects which become invisible to everyday vision and interaction. Moreover, McCracken 
(1990), discussing the material cultures of consumption, writes of the ritualisation of consumer 
goods such that apparently 'meaningless' objects can be incorporated (into the larger 'body' of the 
house?) and divested by means of intricate rituals.  One of the most common examples is the 
obsessive concern with other people's dirt when moving house or buying second-hand - known 
dirt is much less of a threat and unknown dirt must be given extra hygiene to purify it.
Cyborgs and prosthetics: new and old
The current dominant interpretations of the object (and by extension the home as the largest 
consumer object, as well as a prime site of display, reproduction and use) in consumer studies 
(sociological and cultural) are as a repository of meanings and as the site for social exchange and 
reproduction.  However, more recent work is engaging with a view of consumption that goes 
beyond consumption (and home) as either symbolic representation or materialist alienation.  In 
many ways, these new configurations revisit materialism but with alienation given a gloss (quite 
literally) unfamiliar to Marxist theory.14  In this work, the object is afforded a dual and unfinished 
space, the site of many interactions both objectified and subjectified simultaneously.  This work 
14 There is some purchase in the idea of philosophical continuities between alienation in Marx and the 
centrality of processes of alienation and embodiment employed in contemporary work but here is not 
the place to explore them.  See for example Miller (1987), Hetherington & Munro (1996) – especially 
chapter by Munro, and Strathern (1991, 1992)
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might best be represented by the term ‘cyborgology’. Following similar poststructuralist critiques 
of division (showing the fictional nature of the divide), cyborgology has sought to inhabit 
boundaries.  Unlike poststructuralism however, cyborgology seeks to extend the concept of the 
boundary beyond linguistic structures, to bring it back into the fundamental divide: the division 
between ‘nature’ or the world of things, and ‘culture’ or the known world.  Central to such 
debates is the fundamental assumption of the necessary boundary between alien and non-alien 
objects, the familiar and the horrifying.  Linguistically, they are but words and letters away from 
each other: in other words, not very far at all.  In other (structuralist) words, you can never have, 
for example, cleanliness without dirt. For poststructuralists, it is essential to recognise this 
constitution of difference in language; for cyborgologists however, dirt and cleanliness as 
categories have to be refigured alongside dirt and cleanliness as prosthetic entities, attachments, 
as material interferences with the order of discourse.  To put it another way, cyborgology asks 
difficult questions about the status of things and bodies in a way that poststructuralism often 
sidesteps.15  Cyborgology does often deal with the prosthetic as metaphor, as a linguistic device 
for grasping new forms of consciousness (Haraway, 1991).  But it also takes seriously the 
extending and extensive effects of new technologies in grasping how bodies work.  As such 
much of the useful literature on embodiment emerges out of this cyborg consciousness (Stone, 
1996; Hables-Gray, 1995).
Our interest however is to examine how such approaches might be used in empirical research. 
The contention here is that the cyborg is a new formulation necessitated by rapidly changing 
technology, but that the principles of such thinking are found in earlier philosophical and 
psychological ideas.  There are some attempts to ground the notion of the prosthetic in ‘ordinary’ 
15 Compare for example, the subtle but important differences between the conceptions of the body in 
Butler (1993) and Grosz (1995).
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cultures (Lury, 1998; Leach, 1998a, 1998b) such that cyborg concepts do not simply deal with 
spectacular technologies.  It is the ordinary technologies – ie. ways of configuring the lifeworld, 
both cognitively and materially together and inseparably – that we are concerned with here.  It is 
our contention then, not that there is something new cyborg-ish about houses and objects (on the 
contrary they are very, very old social forms) but that cyborgology (old and new) offers useful 
insights in understanding victimisation.
The Architectural Uncanny: houses as larger bodies
‘Old’ cyborgology here is used to mean those ideas which takes seriously the interrelatedness and 
fictionality of the subject/object division.  In different but related ways this is found in a tradition 
connecting Freud, Winnicott, Heidegger, Douglas and others.  Perhaps the central body of work 
that can be used to unlock the experience of burglary emerges from the interface of philosophy 
and psychoanalysis and which deals with the uncanny.  Freud’s use of the uncanny has had an 
extremely suggestive and influential role in the analysis of the leakage between boundaries that is 
always necessary in boundary-drawing cultures.  The uncanny is that which is unknown but in 
the German, unheimlich means unhomely.  This interesting distinction has been extensively 
discussed as a figure for symbolic activity in general: if home is that which is familiar and close 
(homely), beyond the home exists that which is defined as unknown, dangerous.  
Freud’s central interest was to use the home as figure for known spaces: this motif is evident in 
Heidegger’s use of space as a way of figuring knowledge and experience.16 Such a metaphoric 
use of space as knowledge is crucial to understanding the way belonging is defined and 
problematised.  But it is also vital to redouble this figuring back onto literal spaces to show up 
16 See for example Wigley’s (1995) discussion of the architectural metaphor in Derrida’s deconstructive 
technique: here Heidegger’s spatial entities – house, dwelling, clearing – are used as the ur-boundaries 
for deconstruction to disrupt.
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their symbolic centrality and immediacy within the processes of everyday living.  In other words, 
‘house’ as a metaphor for the known world that is drawn in around oneself is so very central 
symbolically because it is literally immediate.  In phenomenological fashion, the house is the 
product of everyday, ordinary yet vitally important distinctions and praxes that provide the 
possibility for symbolic existence.
It is also crucial to note that the unheimlich is so important as adjunct to the heimlich because 
they are inseparable.  The key point here is that the familiar is always threatening to break out of 
its boundaries, to leak, to be intruded upon.  This is because the working out of such boundaries 
of known and unknown is a labour of division (Hetherington & Munro, 1996): such symbolic 
activity is a fiction that can easily be transgressed by the realisation of the brute horror of not 
knowing.
This invasion of the known by the unknown causes deep uncertainty: it is uncertainty itself.  It is 
best demonstrated by the most obvious uncanninesses of bodily experience and the ways in 
which bodily experience is integrated into the social and the symbolic.  The internal organs and 
functions of our bodies are the most proximate experiences we have yet they are some of our 
most horrific.  Digestions and indigestions, leakages, piercings and penetrations: such stuff is the 
immediate unknown that configures our sense of comfort and discomfort, known and unknown, 
taste and disgust.  This leakiness of the body is a way of understanding our embeddedness within 
the home: drawing into ourselves a material collection of known things, we try to forget that 
these things are things and not-us.  Home, then, is the things that have lost their thingliness; 
home and body are simply wider concentric circles (see below on Winnicott’s spaces), things 
subject to our (apparent) control, always threatening to leak out of this control:
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Any house is a far too complicated, clumsy, fussy, mechanical counterfeit of the 
human body… The whole interior is a kind of stomach that attempts to digest 
objects… The whole life of the average house, it seems, is a sort of indigestion.  A 
body in ill repair, suffering indisposition – constant tinkering and doctoring to keep it 
alive.  It is a marvel we, its infesters, do not go insane in it and with it.  Perhaps it is a 
form of insanity we have to put in it.  Lucky we are able to get something else out of it, 
though we do seldom get out of it alive ourselves (Frank Lloyd Wright, quoted in 
Wigley, 1995: frontispiece)
The embeddedness of the body in the social (for some poststructuralists, it is the constitution of 
the body in the social that is important) reminds us however of the need to negotiate some kind 
of resolution of the body’s unfinished character.  For psychoanalysts the negotiation of symbolic 
space provides one such (fictional, temporary and moveable) resolution.  
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Objects and boundaries: understanding ‘betweenness’
Winnicott’s version of psychoanalysis provides one telling insight into the relationship between 
bodies and objects.  For him, the process of child development occurs in the fundamental 
relationship to the primary carer (in Winnicott’s observations, the mother).  In order to effect the 
separation between the primary narcissistic self (the stage of almost complete absorption) and the 
autonomous self, babies undergo shifts in their subjective experience.  This occurs by gradual 
experience of the not-me through the use of ‘transitional objects’.  The transitional object 
(Phillips, 1988) is any object adopted by the infant that comes to represent security in the absence 
of a parent - it does this by combining the qualities of a thing both loved and hated, both present 
and absent, both permanent and transitory, and both independent of the child's will and controlled 
by her.  This multiple nature is created by the emergent separation of child from parent but at the 
same time serves to effect or at least aid that separation. The transitional object is then, for 
Winnicott, a representation of (although not a substitute for) the space between people. The 
security a child feels through the presence of a primary carer must be diminished in their absence. 
In the loss of that certainty, children play with, feel affection for and attack objects in order that 
they might learn otherness.  This sense of otherness is crucial for the ability to interrelate with 
others: the ‘linking of subjective reality to shared reality’ (Phillips, 1988: 117).  But the dual 
status of the transitional object highlights beautifully the requirements for negotiation of this 
uncanny divide.  As Winnicott points out, it is:‘neutral territory… there is a tacit understanding 
that no one will claim that this real thing is created by the world or that it is created by the infant. 
It is understood that both these things are true: the infant created and the world provided it’ 
(Phillips, 1988: 117)
It is easy to see the significance of this theory for the understanding of actual, physical objects, as 
well as those things constituted as symbolic objects (eg. mothers), and, moreover, for an 
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understanding of space in general.  This can be found in the related Winnicottian concept of 
‘holding’: the child needs to be held by the primary carer in order that it achieves a sense of 
continuity of experience, in spite of the child’s own vicissitudes of emotional and libidinous 
desires.  The holding of the child provides the space from which ‘breaking out’ into oneself can 
occur. This idea often finds a spatialized explanation:
In a practical sense the little child needs to break away from the mother’s arms and lap, 
but not to go into space, the breaking away has to be to a wider area of control, 
something that is symbolical of the lap from which the child has broken away.  A 
slightly older child runs away from home, but at the bottom of the garden has finished 
running away.  The garden fence is now symbolical of the narrower aspect of holding 
which has just been broken up, shall we say the house.  Later, the child works out all 
these things in going to school and in relation to the other groups that are outside the 
home.  In each case these outside groups represent a getting away from the home and 
yet at the same time they are symbolical of the home that has been broken away from 
and in fantasy broken up. (Winnicott, in Davies & Wallbridge, 1981: 135)
We are suggesting here that such ideas locate fundamental experiences of the world that is not-
me (the alien, objectified, uncanny/canny) in early childhood experience.  Moreover, it is argued 
that there is some continuity between childhood experience and adult perceptions of objects and 
spaces. This idea has strong reminders of, and parallels to, some very central questions in 
philosophy and the social sciences.  
In particular, what such psychoanalytic models do is provide an explanatory framework for some 
of the experiential dramas at the heart of wider and more literal boundary disputes.  In many 
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ways although Winnicott, like others above, uses the space of the house as a graspable metaphor 
for social space and bodies, in fact it is just as relevant and logical to turn the metaphor around. 
The phenomenology of spaces found in the work of Bachelard (1994) or Vidler (1992) highlights 
the social and symbolic centrality to people of actual houses in their lived, material constitution. 
Our argument here is that as well as being logically possible to see the psychoanalysis and 
phenomenology of people in spaces as compatible, it is also necessary for an understanding of 
the intricate details of the value of home-as-lived.  Geographies and anthropologies of social 
spaces do achieve this to an extent (see, for example, Thrift & Pile, 1995; Douglas, 1984, 1991) 
by taking seriously the boundary and its leakages.  Structuralist anthropology in particular has 
identified the centrality of the boundary as the key defining feature of social ordering.  As in the 
work of Winnicott, the boundary in Douglas or Levi-Strauss represents a series of concentric 
circles which cultural insiders butt up against and outsiders invade.  In such analyses, the idea of 
home, as in Freud, is that which is close, familiar.  
The boundary, however, cannot simply be taken as a given, as poststructuralism has shown us: it 
needs to be understood as constructed, policed and unfinished.  Boundaries imply separation and 
structuralist anthropology can often reify this separation.  Instead the processual nature of the 
boundary needs to be clarified.  As in Winnicott this processual boundary making can be 
recognised as a disturbance.  To overcome this disturbance, humans develop strategies for 
coping: fictions, politenesses and tacit knowledges that confirm the apparent clarity and fixity of 
boundaries.  When such politenesses are made explicit (as ethnomethodology shows us 
convincingly) a deep discomfort can be invoked.
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Familiarity: dynamics of embodied remembering & forgetting
Our central argument here, then, is that what is neglected in victimology studies is a full grasp of 
what it means to be victimised.  Of crucial significance in this experience is the meaning and 
experience of boundary transgression.  It is not, however, simply a (structuralist) case of the 
outside invading the inside; rather, we suggest that burglary serves to highlight the problematic 
accord that people make with boundaries in order to live comfortably.  In the everyday lifeworld, 
it is necessary to ignore our dual status as both 'me/not-me' entities.  Our objects and the ‘skin’ of 
our living (in the form of the house) are a constant physical presence, concrete poetry that could 
(but doesn’t) remind us of our betwixt-and-between existence.
Why do we say that objects and houses could but don’t remind us of our contradictory and 
unfinished existence?  Because the precise task of the familiar is to be forgotten, to blend in with 
the background.  At the same time, however, objects and things are always just there in their 
brute existence.  Possessions and belongings seem to have this dual status, like the Gestalt 
images which can be two things, but are never really perceived as both simultaneously.  Like 
Winnicott’s transitional objects, actual objects in adult life seem both ours, created in our own 
image and form, and they represent the world, structures, otherness at large.  It is this paradox 
that it is at the heart of much recent discussion of consumption. In other words, this dilemma is 
how to understand the transformations between objects as fragments of a system of fashion, part 
of a system of exchange of value, and objects as possessions, apparently expressive and 
interpellating entities that speak directly to the sense of self of the owner/user.
We must ask though, how it is that such transformations are actually effected within everyday 
lives, how such a forgetting (such that life can be lived unencumbered by a surfeit of horror at 
alien objects) can take place?  The work of Merleau-Ponty and others who attempt to ground the 
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living of boundary-struggles within embodied experience gives us a remarkably similar answer to 
that offered by Winnicott.  Grosz argues that ‘Merleau-Ponty… speculates that there must be a 
distinct stage in the infant’s development in which the opposition between virtual and real space 
does not exist’ (1995: 91).  This idea of a disruption of the apparent imagined (subjective) life of 
the child and the real (objective) world of others is addressed explicitly by Merleau-Ponty in his 
concern to elucidate the bodily praxis of knowing.  The carnal possibilities of the body form a 
pre-subjective bodily knowledge that allow for categorisations (eg. subject/object divisions) to be 
made.  These ideas are centred on a relationship between people and objects that is inseparable: 
knowledge-of 17objects is always knowledge-by a body.  
What this bodily knowing implies to us is an appreciation of the experience of home and the 
things in it that is often unmediated: the body learns its particular praxes within objective spaces 
and in so doing constitutes those spaces.  Because of the lack of (Cartesian) separation between 
bodies and environments, there is a kind of physical remembering written on the body, and a 
forgetting of the difference between 'me' and 'not-me' that operates simultaneously to engender a 
sense of comfort.
Burglary revisited: Invasion of the Body Snatchers?
The conclusions that we draw from putting together these two very different bodies of work –
victimology and the theoretical issues of homeliness – focus on what happens when burglary 
occurs.  We suggest that the ideas above offer a way of understanding the particular 
transgressions that are so disturbing.  Specifically, burglary is so emotionally and physically 
upsetting because it stimulates a sort of existential dread or ‘bad faith’: ontological security is 
17 This type of language use is common within phenomenology as a deliberate attempt to overcome 
dualism by highlighting the interdependence of bodies, objects and ideas.
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immediately, instantaneously and lastingly revealed for the necessary fiction that it is18.  It is not 
so much that burglary is the invasion of outsiders (although this is a prerequisite for our 
analysis); rather that the very issue of inside/outside maintenance is made evident.  It is a real life 
‘breaching experiment’ (Garfinkel, 1967) which disinters the drives behind tact and security that 
enable us to live without dread.
Moreover, the significance of the invasion is problematised by the embodied nature of the 
relationship to home and things: by their very nature, familiar objects are conceived of and lived 
as extensions of the body.  The necessity of familiarity in homeliness creates this praxis of 
proximity: things that are so close to the body, that are in the body, that they feel amputated by 
burglary.   This horror at quasi-amputation is akin (although not as intense) to the horror at 
pollution, piercing and cutting, violence (Douglas, 1984; Price & Shildrick, 1999) and it is this 
that engenders the real loss.  
The loss of objects, crucially, is much more than the loss of part of a cognitive, discursive 
identity.  As discussed above, sentimental value needs to be understood as more than just the 
sense of the meaning of objects in relation to the biographical narratives people tell about 
themselves.  Objects are valuable because they are rich with sensory and memory laden 
experience, as well as representing identity.  In this way, we need to understand the hierarchies of 
value-as-lived of particular objects.  Thus the experience of loss is often experienced 
retrospectively in burglary (people do not always know what something means until it is gone) 
and this loss can be of apparently unsentimental items. Here, we suggest that (although not 
18 It lasts for different lengths of time for different people; some of the more helpful accounts of 
burglary experience indicate the temporal scale of trauma – some people relive this dread at intervals, 
some manage to reinstate the fictions of control.
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specifically about loss) a sense of matter out of place is as important in the sense of loss as a 
careful and rational sense of what something represents.
Thus, we would argue that a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of our relationship 
to our home and possessions is both a necessary and timely intervention in the attempts of 
criminologists, victimologists and related professionals to both theorise burglary victimisation 
and to address the more ‘practical’ issues encountered in contact with victims on a daily basis. 
We would expect such developments of existing approaches to have a number of possible 
outcomes.  In particular, more detailed qualitative work might be conducted to explore the full 
impact of property crime in this vein.  The potential aims of such research would include an 
investigation into the significance of home and embodied experiences for both victims and 
burglars to expose the cultural disjuncture that allows crime to occur.  This in turn may feed into 
crime prevention strategies.  Most pertinently, we expect such ideas to be of use in victim 
support, both in terms of developing programmes for re-appropriation of personal space and in 
terms of giving weight to the full and detailed impact of property crime in victim impact 
statements.  Research in this vein might pursue professional strategies for unpacking the 
experience of invasion, loss and recovery of ontological security for victims.  Such strategies 
could pay attention to bodily experiences as they contribute to a general sense of incivility within 
spatial environments, and could feed into discussions on the extent of crime reporting, since 
while reporting is so closely linked to monetary loss and actual physical harm, the implications of 
burglary and related offences, as we have demonstrated, significantly transcend these constraints.
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